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ment of the English monarch as a territorial sovereign in contrast to the continental
feudal kings, its historical justification no longer exists. The increasingly artificial nature of state boundaries, the spreading of metropolitan areas into two or more states,
and the ever more universal and rapid methods of transportation all demand a modem
approach to the problem of process.

Receivers-Priorities-Wage Claims Preferred over Debts Due the United States
-[Missouri].--In a Missouri state court receivership proceeding,' wage claimants
sought priority under a state statute.2 The Federal Housing Authority, as assignee of
a note of the debtor, claimed priority under Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes3
which gives priority to debts due the United States in cases, among others,4 "in which
a debtor .... makes a voluntary assignment .... [and] cases in which an act of bankruptcy is committed." Held, that the wage claims should be paid before the claims of
the United States. The priority given the claims of the United States by Section 3466
is to be interpreted with reference to Section 64(a) of the National Bankruptcy Act, to
which Section 3466 is linked. Section 64 of the Bankruptcy Acts gives priority to wage
claims over debts due the United States; and a proper construction of Section 3466
requires that under it the claims of the United States be given only that priority which
is granted them in bankruptcy proceedings. Emory v. St. James Distillery,Inc. (United
States, Intervenor).6
The court's construction of Section 3466 is unsupported by precedent. In Kupshire
Coats, Inc. v. United States,7 the New York Court of Appeals held that Section 64 of
the Bankruptcy Act did not modify the apparent priority, under Section 3466, of
United States tax claims over wage claims; and in other situations the courts have
uniformly refused to construe the priority given under Section 3466 as being limited
by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act.8
Section 3466, however, does expressly apply in situations which are "acts of bankruptcy." In order to determine the scope of that term in Section 3466 at any given
'The proceeding was instituted in accordance with the provisions of Mo. Stat. Ann. (1929)
§4960.
2Mo. Stat. Ann. (1929) § 1168.
3 Rev. Stat. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C.A. § I91 (1927).
4 The other cases include insolvency, insufficiency of decedent's estate to meet all debts,
attachment of effects of absconding, concealed, or absent debtor by process of law.
s As amended, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 1i U.S.C.A. § io4 (Supp. 194o).
7 272 N.Y. 221, 5 N.E. (2d) 715 (1936).
6 143 S.W. (2d) 318 (Mo. App. 1940).
8 In re Assignment of Simpson, Inc., 258 App. Div. 148, 15 N.Y.S. (2d) 1021 (1939) (United
States allowed tax penalties in assignment for benefit of creditor proceedings, while such
penalties not provable in bankruptcy proceedings); Spokane County v. United States, 279
U.S. 80 (1929); People of New York v. United States, io6 F. (2d) 210 (C.C.A. 3d 1939); In re
Lincoln Chair & Novelty Co., Inc., 274 N.Y. 353, 9 N.E. (2d) 7 (1937).
The court in the instant case does not explain its holding that the wage claims, in order to
be entitled to priority, must meet the requirements of both the state act and the Bankruptcy
Act. It may be urged that since the position of claims of the United States in the scale of
priorities is exclusively for Congressional determination, the presence or absence of a state
statute is of no significance.
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time, it is necessary to refer to at least Section 3(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, defining
"acts of bankruptcy." It is but a slight additional step to say that Section 64 of the
Bankruptcy Act must also be referred to in order further to clarify the meaning of the
priority given by Section 3466. In view of the nature of the considerations which motivate the granting of priority to labor claims in a bankruptcy proceeding, the additional
step taken by the court in the instant case may be justifiable.
It is also possible to deny the FHA's claim to priority on the ground that under the
National Housing Act9 the FHA could not in any case claim the priority given by
statute to "the United States." The lack of the corporate form"° should not be of any
great significance, since the FHA has many of the same attributes deemed significant
in denying priority to federal corporations. The National Housing Act provides for
a fund for the purpose of carrying on the functions of the FHA;"1 gives the administrator power to sue and be sued; 2 and establishes an agency whose functions may be said
to be "commercial" rather than "governmental."13 Moreover, priority has been denied to governmental agencies even in the absence of the corporate form; thus, in
United States v. CuarantyTrust Company of New York,'4 priority was denied the United
States on claims arising out of loans to railroads under the Transportation Act.'s The
court in that case stressed the fact that the loans were intended to stimulate the credit
of the railroads, and that the allowance of priority would tend to reduce the credit
standing of borrowing roads. The same considerations would appear to be applicable
with reference to the FHA, with the added consideration that since the prospective
creditor has no means of ascertaining which loans of his prospective debtor may in the
future be insured, the credit standing of all prospective debtors is decreased. The
argument for denial of priority is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme Court, in
allowing the garnishment of funds of the FHA, has stressed the commercial aspects
of the agency.' 6 Finally, there is perhaps some significance in the fact that the FHA
has been consistently denied priority in those instances in which it acquired (i.e., became assignee of) claims after the commencement of an insolvency proceeding'7 or
948 Stat. 1246 (1934), z2 U.S.C.A. § 1701 (1936).
OSee

United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U.S. 549, 570

(1922) (corporation in which United States owned all stock denied priority in bankruptcy on

ground that there was no debt due United States).
x, As amended, 49 Stat. 722 (I935), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1702 (1936).

1 Ibid.
'Z3See FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940).
'4 280 U.S. 478 (193o); Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271 U.S. 236 (1926). But cf. Piedmont Corp. v. Gainesville & N.W.R. Co., 3 o F. (2d) 525 (D.C. Ga. 1929), where claims arising

under the Transportation Act were given priority as debts due the United States over wage
claims preferred by state law, in a state insolvency proceeding.
"s 41 Stat. 457, 459-61 (1920), 49 U.S.C.A.

§§

71-74 (1929).

16FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (i94o); United States v. Winkle Terra Cotta, 110 F. (2d) 99
(C.C.A. 8th I94O). Cf. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414,416 (i940), where it was held

that, the FHA being an agency of the United States, its claim was not barred by a state statute
of limitations.
X7United States v. Marxen, 307 U.S. 200 (i939); In re Miller, ioS F. (2d) 926 (C.C.A. 2d
26 F.

1939); In re Hansen Bakeries, Inc., io3 F. (2d) 665 (C.C.A. 3d i939); In re Wissmeier,
Supp. 8o6 (N.Y. 1939).
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after the death of the debtor; 8 those cases may indicate an attempt to limit priority
as much as possible.
On the other hand, several lower federal court cases expressly reject the argument
that the National Housing Act should be construed as denying priority, and hold that
the FHA is a "government instrumentality" entitled to priority. 19 Reliance for this
point of view may be placed upon the lack of the corporate form,v upon the fact that
at least under the mortgage insurance provisions of the National Housing Act, the
United States itself guarantees payment of the debentures issued,21 and upon the fact
that if the FHA is granted priority, its insurance premiums may be cheaper.22 Indeed,
it may be urged that there should be no question raised as to whether the FHA is a
"government instrumentality;" that every act done by the Federal Government within
its delegated powers is "governmental," since no powers thought to be non-governmental would have been delegated. Moreover, it would seem that Congress, in declaring that claims of "the United States" should have priority, could hardly have meant
to exclude that large class of instances in which the claim of the United States is something other than a tax claim.
Taxation-Accrual of Real Property Taxes-Deduction of Property Taxes by
Purchaser in Federal Income Tax Return-[Federal].-Taxes assessed against certain
realty in the District of Columbia as of July 1, '935, for the fiscal year then beginning,
were payable in two equal installments in September 1935 and March 1936. On September 17, the taxpayer purchased the property and was credited on the price with
the taxes allocable to the period between July i and the date of purchase. The taxpayer paid the two installments of taxes in September 1935 and March 1936 and then
claimed a deduction for the second installment in his federal income tax return for the
year 1936. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction on the
ground that the taxes for the current year were already assessed at the time of purchase, that assessed taxes constituted a capital item, and that the payment of them
by the purchaser was merely payment of part of the purchase price of the property;
but the Board of Tax Appeals allowed the deduction. On appeal to the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held, that the assessment of real estate taxes in the
District of Columbia creates only a charge upon the land, and that a lien does not arise
until a delinquency occurs. Since the general rule is that real property taxes accrue
for the purpose of federal income tax returns when the lien for taxes-attaches to the
property, the fact that the taxpayer was the owner when the taxes fell due rendered
him, rather than the previous owner, liable for the taxes and justified him in deducting
the second installment in his federal income tax return. Decision affirmed, one judge
dissenting. Com'r of Internal Revenue v. Rust's Estate.'
1SIn re Wood's Estate, 171 Misc. 542, 12 N.Y.S. (2d) 816 (S. Ct. i939).
19Korman v. Federal Housing Adm'r, 113 F. (2d) 743 (App. D.C. 194o); Wagner v. McDonald, 96 F. (2d) 273 (C.C.A. 8th 1938); In re T. N. Wilson, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 651 (N.Y.
1938).
2o In re

Wilson, 23 F. Supp. 236 (Tex. 1938).

SAs amended, 53 Stat. 8o6 (1939), 12 U.S.C.A. § 17IO(d) (Supp. i94o).

As amended, 53 Stat. Sos (1939), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1709(c) (Supp. 1940).
116 F. (2d) 636 (C.C.A. 4 th 194o).

